Volume 29 Issue 2: Winter 2005
Article Excerpt
Death by a Thousand Signatures:
The Rise of Restrictive Ballot Access Laws and the Decline of Electoral Competition
in the United States
By Oliver Hall
I. INTRODUCTION: DEMOCRACY AND THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN PROBLEM
When Saddam Hussein was re-elected President of Iraq in October of 2002, he
claimed what undoubtedly ranks as the greatest electoral victory of all time,
winning 100% of the vote in an election in which 100% of the electorate voted.
This remarkable performance edged out Hussein’s own previous best, when
he received only 99.96% of the vote in 1995. Few regard these elections as legitimate,
of course; Hussein is widely understood to have been a dictator, not a democratically-elected
president. Hussein ran unopposed in both elections, and voters’ only choices
were “Yes” or “No” in a referendum on whether to extend
Hussein’s absolute power for another seven-year term. As the world knows,
words like fraud and intimidation do not begin to capture the conditions under
which these elections took place.
The sham elections in Iraq under Saddam Hussein are perhaps the best recent
evidence of what has been called the “nonnegotiable political status”
of democracy in the modern era: the idea that democracy has attained an “obligatory
character” because it is demonstrably superior to other forms of government.
Today even absolute dictators seldom reject democracy outright, but argue instead
that their people are not yet ready for democracy or, as in Hussein’s
case, that their governments are actually more democratic than they appear.
But if democracy has attained near-unanimous endorsement as a political ideal,
considerably less agreement exists as to what democracy actually entails. When
the Greeks coined the term demokratia to describe the government of their city-states
some 2500 years ago, the system was distinguished from the aristocracies that
preceded it by the political equality of each citizen. The word demokratia means
“rule of the people,” or as we say today, majority rule. These
two concepts, political equality and majority rule, remain fundamental to any
modern theory of democracy, and no political system that does not aspire to
both can rightly be called democratic. But democracy remains a contested ideal
because these fundamental concepts are in tension. The tension arises because
majority rule can produce outcomes that infringe upon the political equality
of the minority: most obviously, it can prevent the minority from participating
in the political process. When and how to protect the minority in a system of
majority rule—the “countermajoritarian problem” of democracy—is
an ongoing question for any democratic state.
This Article explores one instance of the countermajoritarian problem in
American democracy: how to protect the rights of minor parties and independent
candidates participating in an electoral system dominated by two major parties.
In particular, this Article focuses on the effect of modern ballot access laws
on candidates’ rights, arguing that courts ought to treat these laws as
a presumptively impermissible form of “collusion in restraint of democracy.”
Although the article borrows the language of antitrust law, this argument is
rooted in core constitutional principles and rights guaranteed under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. Nevertheless, the analogy to antitrust law is useful
as a means to address the decline of electoral competition in the United States
and its consequences for the democratic character of our government. Antitrust
law also provides a legal framework for distinguishing between nonpartisan
and bipartisan legislation, as the analogy helps distinguish between legitimate
regulation of the political process by the state and collusion in restraint
of democracy by the two major parties.
Part II begins with a discussion of elections’ function in a democracy,
addressing the lack of electoral competition in the United States and identifying
prominent anticompetitive features of American democracy, mainly modern ballot
access laws. Part II provides a brief history of ballot access laws in the United
States and an analysis of their justification. Part III analyzes the Supreme
Court’s modern ballot access jurisprudence, starting with the first minor
party challenge to a modern ballot access law in 1968 and tracing the erosion
of candidates’ rights since then. Finally, Part IV sketches an approach
to ballot access jurisprudence that offers greater protection to candidates’
rights by analyzing ballot access laws according to the principles of antitrust
law.
For full article text, please download from Westlaw
or Lexis or contact the
Law Review for purchase information.
|